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Abstract  
A striking feature of the UK’s 2016 EU referendum and particularly its aftermath has been the 
eruption back into mainstream political and media discourse of spatial language and representations. 
As commentators, politicians and citizens have sought to make sense of the splintering and convulsion 
occasioned by the referendum, a spatial imaginary and lexicon has emerged – which for example, 
references ‘left behind places’ populated by ‘left behind’ citizens, and contrasts these with 
‘metropolitan cores’ populated by ‘metropolitan elites’. Informed by this context the present paper 
identifies and unpacks some of the spatial imaginaries foregrounded in the UK’s ‘European debate’ 
and the aftermath of the 2016 EU referendum. 
Keywords: spatial imaginairies; EU referendum; performativity     
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‘Qu’est-ce qu’une idéologie sans un espace auquel elle se réfère, qu’elle décrit, dont 
elle utilise le vocabulaire et les connexions, dont elle contient le code?’  
(Lefebvre, 1974, 55). 
 
‘Today, we stand on the verge of an unprecedented ability to liberate global trade for 
the benefit of our whole planet with technological advances dissolving away the 
barriers of time and distance. 
It is potentially the beginning of what I might call ‘post geography trading world’ 
where we are much less restricted in having to find partners who are physically close to 
us.  
Liam Fox, UK International Trade Secretary, Manchester, September 2016  
 
Introduction 
 
A striking feature of the UK’s 2016 EU referendum and its aftermath is the eruption back into 
mainstream political and media discourse of spatial language and representations. As 
commentators, politicians and citizens have sought to make sense of the national splintering 
and convulsion unleashed by the referendum, a potent spatial imaginary and lexicon has 
emerged - epitomised, for example, by references to ‘left behind’ places and ‘metropolitan 
cores’. The referendum also had disruptive scalar effects, with a forceful reassertion of the 
nation state and imaginary as the primary legitimate scale of representation and belonging, 
often in combination with nativist and exclusionary (re)interpretations of citizenship 
(Bachmann et Al., 2016). Conceptions of geography have also been prominent in situating the 
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process within a wider global context, notably within debates surrounding the economic 
consequences of remaining in, or leaving the EU. Some ‘hyperglobalist’ supporters of the 
UK’s so-called ‘Brexit’ from the EU have thus advanced arguments that the importance of 
physical proximity and distance is being eroded and that we stand on the threshold of a ‘post 
geography trading world’ (Fox, 2016). Such imaginings are often powerfully affective. As 
Siles-Brügge (2018, p. 3, 1) notes, for some advocates of ‘hard’ Brexit notions of ‘Global 
Britain’ are wrapped up with an ‘emotive spatial imaginary’ of ‘bringing the UK, and its (in 
this imaginary) overly regulated economy, closer to its ‘kith and kin’ in the Anglosphere’.   
 
Against the context outlined above, this paper seeks to reflect on some of the spatial 
imaginaries which have been associated with the UK’s ‘European debate’1 and the 2016 EU 
referendum and its aftermath. Its central contention is that an appreciation of different 
geographical interpretations and representations; the ‘performative’ agency they have 
attained; and, their relationships with material spaces, places and practices, is crucial in 
seeking to understand the causalities and consequences of these intertwined historical 
processes.  
 
 
                                                 
1 The term ‘European debate’ is used here to refer to  the decades long deliberation in UK politics about the   
relationship  between the UK and the rest of  Europe and the various versions of ‘the European project’ which  
have evolved  since WW2. The term is deliberately used here to recognise that there is a ‘prehistory’ to the  
notion of a so-called ‘Brexit’ of the UK from the  present European Union (EU) and that a number of the spatial  
imaginaries which can be identified around the 2016 EU referendum and its aftermath draw heavily upon this.   
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Spatial imaginaries  
 
There is a growing body of work on spatial imaginaries, which are defined by Davoudi (2018, 
p. 101) as: ‘ deeply held, collective understandings of socio-spatial relations that are 
performed by, give sense to, make possible and change collective socio-spatial practices’; 
‘produced through political struggles over the conceptions, perceptions and lived experiences 
of place’; ‘circulated and propagated through images, stories, texts, data, algorithms, and 
performances’; and, ‘infused by relations of power in which contestation and resistance are 
ever present’. 
 
Yet despite its popularity in writing within geography and other disciplines, systematic 
reviews of the field and the different interpretations and uses of the term are arguably rather 
rare.   For Watkins (2015, p. 508, 512) ‘spatial imaginaries’ has become an ‘umbrella term’ 
that potentially obscures the fact that there are at least ‘three different types of spatial 
imaginaries’: 1) Places such as the Orient, Detroit, or Russia; 2) Idealized spaces such as the 
ghetto, developed country, or global city; and 3) Spatial transformations such as 
globalization, gentrification, or deindustrialization (Watkins, 2015, p. 508, 512). He observes 
too that spatial imaginaries have been documented at numerous ‘scales’, or ‘conceptions of 
spatial orderings’ (Table 1). 
TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
 
In addition to addressing definitional issues, work on spatial imaginaries has also increasingly 
sought to explore the performative as well as ‘simply’ representational properties of 
imaginaries, and to explore their relationships with material spaces, places and practices.   
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The attention to performativity is a response to the fact that existing works ‘predominantly 
describe spatial imaginaries as representational discourses about places and spaces’ (2015, p. 
508), and there are only a few treatments which define imaginaries as performative. Davoudi 
argues that this latter dimension deserves more attention because imaginaries ‘Constructed 
and circulated through images, discourses and practices,.. generate far reaching claims on our 
social and political lives’ (2018, p.97). The appreciation of spatial imaginaries as vehicles 
through which power is rationalised and mobilised is neatly captured by Jenny Crawford’s 
(2018) notion of their ‘conscription’ to different power agendas. This chimes well with the 
emphasis placed on the ideological and mobilising properties of socially-constructed 
representations of space and territory, for example, in French geographical tradition 
(Lefebvre, 1974; Santamaria and Elissalde, 2018).  
 
Consideration of the performativity of spatial imaginaries may open avenues to ‘more direct 
analysis of material practices, and considerations of how material practices directly form and 
modify spatial imaginaries’ (Watkins, 2015, p. 519).  Echoing this Davoudi (2018, p.97) calls 
for more attention to be paid to the ‘role of space and place in the construction of social 
imaginaries’.  
 
It will be argued below that such current themes of analysis around the performativity of 
spatial imaginaries and their articulation with, and through, material spaces, places, and 
practices, offer opportunities to develop our interpretations of the role of imagined and 
material space in the UK’s European debate.        
 
Finally, though much work on imaginaries adopts a discursive mode of analysis there have 
been some useful contributions in recent years which provide tools to structure a more 
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systematic form of analysis. For example, drawing on the work of Healey (2007), Crawford 
(2017, p. 20) proposes a set of questions to be used as a framework in analysing spatial 
imaginaries (Box 1).   
 
BOX 1 NEAR HERE 
 
Identifying spatial imaginaries of the UK’s ‘European Debate’  
 
The rest of this paper reflects on what a spatial imaginaries perspective might bring to 
interpretations of the UK’s relationship with Europe, and in particular the 2016 EU 
referendum campaign and its aftermath.   In order to do this we have tentatively identified 
some key imaginaries. This is an inevitably subjective and selective task and we do not claim 
to offer a comprehensive treatment. Some of the labels used to described imaginaries may be 
recognisable from public discourse on the EU referendum and its aftermath – for example, 
that of ‘Left Behind Britain’.  In other cases we have created labels which seek to capture the 
essence of the socio-spatial relations represented and performed through certain imaginaries.   
 
Where relevant, the discussion refers to the definitional and analytical themes outlined in the 
previous section regarding the scale (Table 1), ‘type’, performativity and materiality of 
imaginaries. The paper’s development was also informed by some of the recently proposed 
approaches to conducting more systematic analysis of imaginaries (Box 1), but attempting to 
present all the imaginaries below using such frameworks became unwieldly due to space 
constraints and they are instead presented more discursively.  Similarly, there is not the space 
to fully rehearse the wider debates on the 2016 EU referendum campaign and its aftermath, 
but where appropriate, references are made to themes within this – for example, those 
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pertaining to Empire, nationalism and uneven development, and social fragmentation along 
relational-territorial divides, identified by Bachmann and Sidaway (2016) and others (Jessop, 
2018; Rosamond, 2018).   
 
Some Imaginaries of the UK’s ‘European debate’ and 2016 EU referendum campaign 
 
British Eurosceptics, in the years before and during the 2016 UK EU referendum (‘the 
referendum’), are generally seen as having been very successful in articulating and 
dominating the linguistic parameters and terms of the debate on the UK’s place in Europe 
(Goodwin, 2017). The very ‘naming and framing’ of the whole notion of leaving the UK 
leaving the EU as a ‘Brexit’ (‘British Exit’), meant that even those of a more pro-European 
sensibility have found that they have to discuss the European issue in the ‘dream language’ of 
the sceptics. During the 2016 referendum the Leave Campaign
2
 was able to build on this base 
and deploy powerful slogans like ‘Take Back Control’. The contention below is that the 
Eurosceptics not only managed to dominate the referendum campaign linguistically, but also 
succeeded in articulating and ‘conscripting’ (Crawford, 2018) to their cause (through text and 
image) the most striking spatial imaginaries.    
 
A Sceptred Isle (Under Siege) 
                                                 
2
 The ‘Leave campaign’ featured a number of different campaigns principally Vote Leave and Leave.EU. Initially seen by some as 
a potential weakness, the plurality of the Leave campaign may well have been one of the decisive factors in the result, allowing the  
Leave message to be tailored to different social groups and certain statements to be supported, or disavowed by those campaigning  
to leave the EU. This was notably the case surrounding the notorious ‘red bus ‘claim about future funding for the National Health  
Service (NHS) (Merrick, 2017 ) and the varying degrees of nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric emanating from different parts of the  
campaign. It also allowed funding limits to be breeched through the creation of shadow groups which received significant  
extra resources in the last days of the campaign (Shipman and Ungoed-Jones, 2018).  In the remainder of this paper the term ‘Leave  
campaign’ will be used with specific detail of which ‘wing’ of this is being referred to being supplied where necessary.    
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Contemporary geopolitical issues such as the migrant crisis in mainland Europe may well 
have weighed heavily in the campaign, allowing the development of imaginings of risk and 
fear by elements of the leave side. However, the leave narrative was also able draw on longer 
term and deeply rooted spatial imaginaries which emphasised Britain’s insular and 
exceptional nature in comparison to a continental ‘other’.  This echoed themes explored by 
Young (1999, 2016) around Britain’s relationship with ‘Europe’ in general and the ‘European 
project’ in particular. Adopting the language of Shakespeare (King Richard II, Act 2, Scene 
1), Young argued that ‘The mythology of the scepter’d isle, the demi-paradise, bit deep into 
the consciousness of many who addressed the [European] question’ and that ‘The sacredness 
of England, whether or not corrupted into Britain, became a quality setting it, in some minds, 
for ever apart from Europe’ (Young, 2016). It seems almost banal to note that the ‘Scepter’d  
Isle’ could be classed as an imaginary of Idealized space to use Watkins’s (2015) terms! But 
it wasn’t just the insular physical space that was special, ‘The island people were not only 
different but, mercifully, separate, housed behind their moat. They were also inestimably 
superior, as was shown by history both ancient and modern’ (Young, 2016). The language 
used, for example in the pages of certain Eurosceptic newspapers, and the rhetoric of some 
leading ‘Brexiters’ over many years - and reaching a crescendo during the 2016 campaign, 
echoed such sentiments (e.g. ‘Britain is not like other countries’ as the leave supporter, British 
Conservative MP, David Davis wrote in 2016).   
 
The imaginary of insular exceptionalism found its foil in the invocation of a potent ‘imagery 
of place’ (Watkins, 2015), which represented ‘Brussels’ as a shorthand for the EU project and 
its various elements (notably the European Commission) and it alleged failings. This 
imaginary of ‘Brussels’ however did not reference/represent the material place, or its 1.2 
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million people, the Grote Markt/Grande Place, or Manneken Pis Statue etc.. Rather it was 
conscripted to capture ‘all that was wrong’ with the EU, and project an image of a remote and 
‘grey’ administrative place of foreign political duplicity, anti-British foment, bloated 
bureaucracy and corruption. As Bachmann and Sidaway (2016, p.49) note, certain British 
politicians succeeded in ‘convincing a sufficient number of voters’ that austerity and decline 
were a product of ‘external factors – first and foremost ‘external rule’ from Brussels’. For 
many voters therefore, though the EU may not always ‘have a face’ (with many being 
unfamiliar with, for example, their MEPs, or key EU figures), in the invocation of the 
imaginary of ‘Brussels’ it was always identified with an ‘other/ed’ place. 
 
The longstanding themes of independence, and insular exceptionalism outlined above and 
contemporary geopolitical events – notably the migrant and financial and economic crises of 
the 2000s into the 2010s, fed into a new imaginary during the 2016 referendum campaign. 
Though quickly branding the Remain campaign’s, largely economically focused warnings of 
the possible economic effects of leaving the EU, as ‘Project Fear’, the leave campaign 
mounted its own version of this in which spatial representations of ‘external threat’ played a 
significant role. In this the ‘Sceptred Isle’ was now under siege. This imaginary was 
supported by a lexicon of geographical mobility and flux with references to ‘open borders’,  
‘migrants’, ‘influxes’, ‘flows’ and ‘swarms’ (Elgot, 2016), constructing an spatial imaginary 
of the openness of the UK to ‘others’ from ‘other places’, and notably ‘openess to’ (in an echo 
of Said’s 1978 pioneering work on imaginaries and western stances towards the ‘Orient’) ‘to 
the East’. This narrative was powerfully supported by visual representations notably Vote 
Leave’s ‘Countries set to join the EU’, and ‘What the EU ‘tourist deal’ means’ posters, and 
UKIP’s ‘Breaking Point’ poster (Figures 1, 2 and 3). If Britain had been created a ‘demi 
paradise’ and ‘a fortress built by nature for herself’ against the ‘envy of less happier lands’ 
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(King Richard II, Act 2, Scene 1), these natural advantages it was suggested were being 
eroded by continued entanglement in a supranational European structure.  
 
FIGURES 1,2, 3 NEAR HERE 
 
Global Britain v. Little Europe 
 
Yet if Britain’s ‘scepter’d’ isle’, the ‘precious stone set in the silver sea’ (Shakespeare, King 
Richard II, Act 2, Scene 1) was presented as being at the mercy of the machinations of 
‘foreign’ powers and their ‘Brussels-based’ bureaucrats, and assieged by flows of migrants, 
some leave campaigners argued that this did not mean the ‘Brexit’ project was hostile to all 
external political economic, social, and spatial relations. The narrative of ‘Global Britain’ 
promoted by leading leave supporters sought to ‘get behind’ the arguments of remain 
supporting internationalists, implying that it was they who were insular in still thinking of 
Europe when Britain’s destiny and potential were more properly global. The fact that certain 
other EU states were more significant global trading powers than the UK whilst being firmly 
within the bloc, did not prevent the ‘Global Britain’ imaginary from playing an important role 
in selling the ‘Brexit’ project, apparently attenuating some of its shaper nationalist angles and 
making it palatable to a wider ‘liberal/globalist’ constituency. As Isakjee and Lorne (2018, 
p.7) note ‘Contrary to the notion that the new politics is about closure as opposed to openness, 
those opposing EU membership were happy to extol the virtues of global connections and 
relationships’ though as they note this was to be ‘only on ‘British’; terms, and in ‘British’ 
interests’.   
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The globalist wing of the leave project thus represented an imaginary of spatial 
transformation (Watkins, 2015), which stressed the virtues and ease of global free trade. This 
position was typically coupled with an ultraliberal view of society and regulation which was 
frequently contrasted with the ‘sclerotic’, ‘sinking ship’ of the EU, with its ‘outdated’ social 
market economy (Hannan, 2011), and a belief that advances in information and transport 
technologies made material space and friction less of a factor in trading relations (Fox, 2016). 
This global imaginary is encapsulated by the Facebook post of one fervent leave supporter, 
witnessed by the author, which claimed that ‘Geography doesn’t matter anymore in a 
globalised world’.   
 
The EU as Neoliberal ‘Superspace’ 
 
An imaginary of hyper globalist opportunity and the prospect of supercharged liberal free 
trade outside the EU ‘Socialist Superstate’ (or sometimes ‘EUSSR’), thus fuelled the 
imagination of many political and financial interests that backed leaving the EU. But those of 
the so called ‘Lexit’ (Left Exit) tendency seemed conversely drawn to an imaginary of the EU 
as a peculiarly neoliberal space. This raised interesting dimensions in scalar terms, with the 
EU being at once embedded in a wider liberal world and constituted of ‘from below’ by 
member states whose political classes and populations had largely also opted for liberal 
political programmes over a similar same period that the UK was in the EEC/EU.   Though 
the UK was generally regarded as the EU’s most liberally inclined large member state, the 
hope was that leaving the EU would provide an opportunity for counteraction of the UK’s 
self-liberalising tendency.  Often informed by readings of the work of authors such as Piketty 
(2016) and Varoufakis (2016) (though not necessarily adopting the same position on the 
specific question of whether the UK should leave the EU), ‘Lexiters’ articulated emotive 
13 
 
imaginaries of place, in particular emphasising the conditions experienced by peripheral and 
southern EU states, following the financial crisis of 2008 and the austerity decade which 
followed.  Within this there were further embedded more discrete imaginaries of place with 
images of, and references to, the sites of protests against austerity of the 2010s – places like 
Syntagma Square in Athens, or Puerta del Sol in Madrid. Such imaginings may not have 
engaged clearly with scalar contexts and paradoxes of leaving the EU, or address the fact that 
leaving the EU would in all probability terminate the UK’s contribution as a wealthier 
member state to solidarity investments in less prosperous parts of Europe. Yet in performative 
terms, they may have contributed to some of those who might normally have been expected to 
oppose a project driven primarily by nationalist, ultraliberal and hard right agendas, aligning 
themselves behind the leave position.  
 
Imaginaries of remain - Europe as a ‘Special Area of Human Hope’?  
 
If the various leave narratives seemed able to represent striking and clear spatial imaginaries 
and sub-imaginaries, then, we might ask, what were the spatial imaginaries conveyed by the 
Remain campaign?  The latter sought to emphasise the virtues of trade with geographically 
proximate neighbouring countries, the UK’s economic, cultural, environmental ties with the 
rest of Europe, and the enhanced geopolitical and global influence that comes with 
membership of the EU. Yet it is arguable that a coherent sense of the ‘idea of Europe’ 
(Hoggart and Johnson, 1987) and an associated compelling spatial imaginary of ‘Europe’ 
proved elusive to the Remain campaign. To many citizens it perhaps appeared as an abstract 
notion and space, taking shape and relevance only at certain times (e.g. during a continental 
holiday; watching the news; ‘Eurovision’; or European sporting events), and not being the 
scale or space/place of the everyday.  The communication of the idea of Europe was 
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complexified by questions like ‘where does/will Europe/the EU end?’, or, observations like 
‘Europe is not the EU’, or ‘We are leaving the EU, not Europe’.    
 
Committed pro-Europeans might well subscribe to the notion of Europe as a ‘special area of 
human hope’ which had figured in the Preamble to the abandoned Constitutional Treaty of the 
mid-2000s (Ferrara, 2007). This tied the space that is the EU to a system of values bound up 
in the work of the Council of Europe from the 1940s onwards, or the acquis communitaire of 
the EEC/EU developed since the 1950s. Within this, the idea of the ‘European model of 
society’ (Faludi, 2007; Nadin and Stead, 2008) with its attachment to ‘inclusive’, 
‘sustainable’, and ‘smart’ development (European Commission, 2010; 2017) figured 
prominently; with this social imaginary often being contrasted with other models - notably 
that of north American capitalism. In spatial terms this model translates into the aspiration of 
greater territorial cohesion in the EU, inscribed into the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, and seen as 
promoting notions of a more balanced (i.e. less uneven) development of the EU (as captured 
by Kunzmann and Wegener’s imaginary of the ‘Bunch of Grapes’ - Figure 4); a more 
competitive EU; more coherent alignment of EU policies and programmes in territorial terms; 
and, a cleaner and greener Europe (Waterhout, 2007; Abrahams, 2013). Yet despite the UK’s 
role in establishing, and experience of, European regional policy (Sykes and Schulze-Baeing, 
2017), Hague (2016) - writing in the aftermath of the EU referendum, commented -’I doubt 
that the phrase ‘territorial cohesion’ was ever uttered in the thousands of speeches and 
pamphlets’ during the EU referendum.  
 
FIGURE 4 NEAR HERE 
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Perhaps the Remain campaign could have invoked stronger and more striking, or ‘affectively’ 
appealing, spatial imaginaries of ‘Europe’? For example, the images of the evolving TEN-T 
network (Figure 5) with its ambition of ‘connecting Europe’ (European Commission, 2018 ) 
and ‘making European space’ (a goal critiqued by some observers for promoting notions of 
frictionless mobility with potentially deleterious environmental impacts, Jensen and 
Richardson, 2004). Yet even when the remain messaging sought to emphasise the benefits of 
belonging to a wider European space it could sound negative  – for example, in citing the 
disruptive impacts of any exit from the EU, with the potential need for people and goods to 
wait at less permeable borders.  
FIGURE 5 NEAR HERE 
There may also have been some circumspection at projecting an optimistic spatial imaginary 
of a Europe of freer flows and of spatial elements such as new cross border regions, for fear 
this might backfire in the face of an opposing campaign making much of the allegedly 
damaging effects of ‘open borders’ and flows of ‘others from other places’. There had been 
specific episodes in the past when EU initiatives such as the territorial cooperation funding 
programme ‘INTERREG’ had been presented by the Eurosceptic press – and indeed even 
government ministers as being plotted by foreign politicians and bureaucrats to undermine the 
territorial integrity of the UK  (Shipman, 2006; Owen, 2011). And what of EU funding to 
support infrastructure plans? Was this not technocratic meddling from precisely the experts it 
was said people had had enough of (Jackson and Ormerod, 2017)?  In such circumstances it 
was perhaps understandable that the Remain campaign was wary of actively seeking to 
invoke a positive affective and relational imaginary of Europe.  
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Absent Imaginaries and Scales? 
 
As well as imaginaries at European, national and global levels, other scales were invoked by 
the campaigns. Even the domestic scale of home was addressed by claims from both sides that 
households would be more or less well-off under remain or leave scenarios. But overall the 
referendum campaign was a deliberation on how the space that is the UK should in future be 
linked and more, or less, integrated with a wider European space and this tended to emphasise 
and reify the UK ‘national’ scale. As a result other scales of imaginary such as those of the 
sub-state nation, subnational region, or city (Table 1) were arguably less represented.   
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly the leave campaign revelled in the scalar ‘nationalism’ of the 
campaign focussing on the ‘national’ UK scale and ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1991) 
and its relationships with the EU and wider world. Though certain cherished leave issues such 
as immigration were nevertheless communicated through sub-state, or local, imaginaries in 
accounts of immigration in particular places (e.g. Boston, Lincolnshire), or consideration of 
certain issues (such as the ‘housing crisis’).   
 
There was, however, one imaginary and geopolitical framing which had previously been a 
staple of the political rhetoric of the neoliberal, and notably ‘Atlanticist’, forebears of the 
‘Brexiters’ of 2016, which was notable by its absence from the Leave campaign. For a variety 
of reasons, some historical, and others which have perhaps become more obvious since the 
vote (Cadwalladr and Jukes, 2018; Wintour, 2018; Kerbaj et Al. 2018), the ‘traditional’, 
‘othering’ and imaginary of ‘threat from the East’ was reoriented away from the northern 
sphere – with the Cold War era emphasis on the ‘Eastern bloc’ (and its arresting imaginary of 
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the ‘Iron Curtain’), USSR/‘Russia’,  towards the southern sphere and the ‘fearing’ of 
refugees, migrants and ‘cultural others’ from this region (Figures 1, 2 and 3). 
 
The Remain campaign for its part certainly made general economic arguments about the 
possible impacts of leaving at the aggregate UK (or sometimes industry sector) level, but also 
referenced benefits that EU membership had brought to particular regions, cities, or natural 
spaces (e.g. EU regional cohesion funding support, or environmental protection), or specific 
investments (e.g. certain university, or cultural/leisure facilities). The particular impacts and 
risks to such progress and to industrial sectors in certain regions (e.g. the automotive industry) 
were also emphasised.  Goodwin (2017, p.16) thus argues that typically ‘Remain focused on 
the internal risk of Brexit whereas Leavers were thinking far more about external threats’. 
 
Also less prominent overall, though significant in their respective territories, were the sub-
state interests and imaginaries of the UK’s Celtic nations. Here the European issue melded 
with issues of devolution, autonomous government, or independence, and the competing UK 
‘national’ imaginary. In such territories the view that collaborative governance and 
subsidiarity should apply across the scales of multi-level governance from the EU to the 
subnational scales was held by many, who feared that ‘Brexit’ could be a cloak allowing a 
‘power grab’ recentralisation of the British polity, or exacerbate old geopolitical issues and 
tensions.  Yet the ‘Scottish’ question (assumed by some to have been settled for a generation 
by the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence) and the complexities which would arise at 
the Ireland – UK border in Northern Ireland if the UK left the EU, did not gain much traction 
in the UK-wide debate, seriously challenge the more dominant imaginaries detailed above, or 
appear to be issues that unduly troubled those advocating the leave option.    
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Imaginaries of an Aftermath  
 
Manley, Jones and Johnston (2017, p.183) note  how ‘Most of the analysis before the 2016 
referendum’ was ‘based on opinion polling which focused  on which groups were more likely 
to support each of the two options, with less attention to the geography of that support’. In 
contrast since the referendum this situation has arguably been reversed with the territorial 
explicans becoming the dominant account of the result. Indeed one of the most striking 
features of the post referendum period is how prominent geographical analyses and spatial 
imaginaries have been within commentaries on the outcome of the vote and debates about the 
likely distribution of the impacts of leaving the EU.   
 
Left Behind Britain (‘Brexitland 1’) 
 
The dominant spatial imaginary of ‘Brexit’ has become that of the revolt of ‘Left Behind 
Britain’.  Here the vote to leave the EU is presented as an outcome, or almost the ‘wages’, of 
the uneven geographical changes produced from the economic structuring and ‘Anglo-liberal’ 
growth model’ (Rosamond, 2018; Hay, 2011) of the latter decades of the 20th. century, in 
which ‘towns and cities suffered from the loss of manufacturing jobs’ whereas ‘well-paid 
service sector jobs have largely been concentrated in London, the South East and financial 
centres in larger British cities’ (Isakjee and Lorne, 2018, p.7).  The result of the referendum is 
thus presented as a cri de coeur expressing discontent with the territorially uneven outcomes 
of processes of ‘globalisation’ and related/nested processes such as European integration. This 
argument sees the pattern of the pro-leave vote reflecting the geographical concentration of 
such a sentiment, and produces an imaginary of a ‘Left Behind Britain’ contrasted with the 
main metropolitan centres -  in particular London, and the prosperous shires of lowland 
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England.   This overarching imaginary of ‘Left Behind Britain’ is also punctuated with 
discrete strong imaginaries of place (Watkins’s 2015), which have cast places like Sunderland 
and Stoke on Trent (Domokos, 2018), as the emblematic sites of a ‘revolt’ against the 
‘establishment’ and globalisation; sometimes rendered as ‘Brexitland’ in media and social 
media accounts.  
 
The leave lobby and the proto-Brexit state, quickly sought to conscript the imaginary of ‘Left 
Behind Britain’; apparently adopting its cause in a struggle against globalisation and 
Europeanisation. Theresa May’s speech at the 2016 Conservative Party conference, thus 
argued that: 
 
… today, too many people in positions of power behave as though they have more in 
common with international elites than with the people down the road, the people they 
employ, the people they pass in the street. 
 
But if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere. You 
don’t understand what the very word ‘citizenship’ means. 
Theresa May (2016) (added emphases) 
  
The speech has been much debated, but what is most relevant here is its use of a language of 
spatiality and scale (see added emphases). Specifically, there is a clear emphasis on/valuing 
of, the local, familiar and ‘domestic’ scale with references to people ‘down the road’, or ‘in 
the street’, which are contrasted and placed in tension with notions of ‘the international’, ‘the 
world’, and citizenship of ‘nowhere’. This echoes the ‘territorial communitarianism’ 
discussed by Santamaria and Elissalde (2018, p.57) in which appropriation of a given space is 
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synonymous ‘with closure, withdrawal and protectionism with respect to the outside’ (2018, 
p.57), and seems to share with ‘Trumpism’ and other populist narratives a desire to ‘cut 
oneself off from globalisation, in the hope that doing so will somehow bring back a bygone 
world’ (Stiglitz, 2017). 
 
‘Remainia’  
 
The tensions and unhealed divisions of the referendum campaign have also surfaced in 
evolving language and imaginaries. The spatial imaginaries of the result outlined above, have 
become overlaid with terms used to characterise/caricature the residents of the different 
islands of ‘Brexit Britain’. The phrase ‘liberal metropolitan elite’ has been commonly used to 
describe those living in the remain voting core cities and prosperous areas and towns of 
lowland England. They have also been more pointedly stereotyped by sections of the press, 
politicians and the commentators as ‘remoaners’, ‘snowflakes’, traitors and ‘saboteurs’. Here 
we have labelled this imaginary of the remain voting areas ‘Remainia’. In some 
interpretations an imaginary has developed into a view that only London, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland voted to remain. This is well illustrated by a rather reductionist graphic from 
CNN (Figure 6) which simply shows the overall result in each region of England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland aggregated using a ‘first past the post in each in region’ logic. 
This both misses the point that the referendum was in fact a UK wide poll and the granularity 
of the voting pattern at lower spatial scales.    
 
FIGURE 6 NEAR HERE 
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This Sceptic Isle? (‘Brexitland 2?) 
 
In response to cariactures developed of remain voters and areas by the leave supporting press 
and politicians, the denizens and pundits of Remainia have gradually evolved their own 
characterisations and imaginaries of ‘Brexit’ places and people. A cover from an edition of 
the New European newspaper founded in the weeks following the referendum (Figure 7) 
illustrates this well. This mimicked a well-known railway poster of the 1930s-1950s for the 
seaside resort of Skegness in Lincolnshire, seen as characteristic of the ‘left behind coastal 
communities’ (Goodwin, 2017, p.15) which had voted to leave the EU. The cheerful original 
‘Skegness is SO Bracing’ poster was rendered instead as ‘Skegness is SO Brexit’.  
 
FIGURE 7 NEAR HERE 
 
In the face of phenomena such as the documented rise in hate crime (Devine, 2017) and 
xenophobia during and after the EU referendum, and the rise of pejorative language to 
describe those who do not subscribe to the ‘Brexit project’, Britain in such imaginaries had 
perhaps become not so much the ‘Sceptred Isle’ as a ‘Sceptic Isle’ – hostile to foreigners, the 
educated, the liberally minded, and even its own younger generations.   
 
‘Comfortable Britain’ (Blimp and Boomer’ Land?) 
 
The dominant antithetical imaginaries of ‘Left Behind Britain/Brexitland’ and ‘Liberal 
Metropolitan/Remainia’, however, tended to ‘shorthand’ the geographical complexity of the 
vote and its consequences. Crucially, whilst it is true that in many less prosperous areas a 
majority of those who actually voted opted to leave, as Dorling notes: 
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Contrary to popular belief, 52% of people who voted Leave in the EU referendum 
lived in the southern half of England, and 59% were in the middle classes, while the 
proportion of Leave voters in the lowest two social classes was just 24%’ (Dorling, 
2016).   
 
In a similar vein Goodwin (2017) observes that of the three key groups that powered the leave 
vote the largest was what the National Centre for Social Research (2016) has termed Affluent 
Eurosceptics. Therefore although the vote is widely represented as a revolt against 
globalisation with an associated imaginary of  ‘Left Behind Britain’, the fact remains that the 
sociology and geography of the EU referendum result is at least as much that of a 
‘Comfortable Britain’ as of ‘Left Behind Britain’ (Dorling 2016).   
 
For Isakjee and Lorne it is thus clear that ‘that a solely economic analysis of Brexit is 
insufficient in either explaining the vote or in the interpretation of disillusionment or what it 
means to feel ‘left behind’’ (2018, p.3).  There are those too who argue that much analysis of 
the results has overemphasised geographical versus value-based explanations of why certain 
individuals may have voted to leave the EU (Kaufmann, 2016).  It seems therefore that 
‘Brexit politics is at least as much about identity’ and values as socio-economic condition(s) 
and that ‘The calls to ‘leave Europe’ do not merely appeal to those feeling left behind 
economically, but they exploit feelings of cultural alienation and actively appeal to racist 
sentiments, too’ (Isakjee and Lorne, 2018, p.3). Immigration and ‘theoretical’ sovereignty 
were certainly key concerns of voters from far beyond ‘Left Behind Britain’ (Goodwin, 
2017), notably (though not solely) across older and more socially conservative demographics, 
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evoking an imaginary perhaps of ‘Comfortable Britain’, or perhaps ‘Blimp and Boomer 
land’3.    
 
Poor Britannia  
 
Immediately following the referendum and over the subsequent period, many observers 
pointed to a territorial contradiction in the results. Many areas that have not only been the key 
UK beneficiaries of EU regional funding, but which - even more significantly, have 
economies that are more integrated with the rest of the EU than those of London and the 
South East, had voted strongly to leave the EU (McCann, 2016, 2018; Semple, 2017). To 
some observers, perhaps viewing regions and places as abstract economic containers, this 
appeared illogical – regardless of the power of socio-spatial imaginaries and Eurosceptic 
propaganda, how, they wondered, could people in some places be persuaded to vote against 
their own apparent material interests (i.e. in light of potential economic impacts)?  A number 
of articles used the analogy of ‘foot shooting’ to describe this apparently pyrrhic choice (Wyn 
Jones, 2016).   
 
                                                 
3
 The term ‘blimpish’ emerged after the creation of the character Colonel Blimp by cartoonist David Low for the 
London Evening Standard in 1934. It has come to be used as shorthand for pompous persons holding 
reactionary views, sometimes with a nostalgic hankering after an Imperial past, perhaps with implicit 
undertones of xenophobia, or even racism.  The term ‘Boomer’ refers to the Baby Boomer generation, a 
demographic which voted to leave more heavily than younger generations adding to existing feelings of 
intergenerational iniquity (McKernan, 2016; Elledge, (2017) and leading to a surge what some termed 
‘boomer blaming’ (Bristow, 2017).  
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The UK Government’s studies on the economic consequences of leaving the EU have 
considered three scenarios – staying in the Single Market, a trade deal with the EU, or no 
deal. In all these scenarios economic growth over the next 15 years is expected to be less than 
if the UK remains fully within the EU (Parker and Hughes, 2018).  Yet aside from the effects 
at an aggregate UK level, the figures also indicate – as already suggested by academic studies 
(Chen et Al., 2017; McCann, 2016, 2018), that the impacts will be varied across different 
parts of the UK, and that many leave voting areas will be potentially be the most negatively 
affected economically if the UK does indeed leave the EU.  
 
 Here we seek to capture this picture of regressive distributional impacts and exacerbated 
uneven development by an imaginary we have term ‘Poor Britannia’.  There is a proximity to 
the ‘Left Behind Britain’ imaginary, but the two are not analogous as there are areas which 
are currently economically buoyant rather than ‘left behind’ due to the presence of certain 
sectors (e.g. automotive and aviation industries), but which come within the ambit of the Poor 
Britannia imaginary with its future orientated focus on potential consequences of leaving the 
EU.    
  
A challenge for ‘Poor Britannia’ it that the ‘success’ of any post-EU UK is likely to be 
gauged mainly in economic terms and – crucially for ‘left behind Britain’, at the aggregate 
national scale. It is at this level that ‘Global Britain’ (see below) needs to be seen to ‘beat the 
competition’, and in keeping with past experiments in neoliberalisation it is still theoretically 
possible (despite the conclusions of most academic, UK government and EU studies) that 
aggregate growth rates may recover to, or exceed, the levels it would have attained if the UK 
had stayed in the EU. But even in such optimistic scenarios the distributional question of 
whether any such growth, if it occurs, trickles down to ‘left behind Britain’ through the 
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natural functioning of the spatial economy, or some mild measures of redistribution, 
addressing the UK’s ‘national-regional economic problem’ (McCann, 2016) is a rather 
different matter.  As Rosamond notes ‘The Anglo-liberal growth model arguably fell into 
crisis long before Brexit emerged as the dominant issue in British politics’ (2018, p.4) and 
uneven development has been one of the persistent manifestations of this.  The potential loss 
of the EEC/EU's regional support structures, whose emergence partly reflected the needs of 
the 'left behind' parts of Britain and the UK's own traditions (from the 1930s onwards until the 
end of the 1970s) of regional policy (Sykes and Schulze-Bäing, 2017), gives an added 
inflexion to such issues.    
 
‘Global Britain’ or ‘Empire 2.0’? 
 
The post- referendum period continues to lay bare how core spatial imaginaries of the 
Eurosceptic vision sit in contradiction and tension. This is unsurprising perhaps, as the 
‘nativist’, ‘territorial communitarian’, ‘anti-globalist’, ‘insular’, ‘nostalgic’ narratives and 
spatial imaginaries articulated during, and for many years before the referendum, were 
mobilised in a leave campaign largely supported financially, and promoted through a media 
owned, by a cast of archetypal hyperglobalists (Coles, 2016; Cadwalladr, 2017).  As Barber 
and Jones (2017, p.154) note: 
 
In proclaiming that ‘June 23 was not the moment Britain chose to step back from the 
world, it was the moment we chose to build a truly Global Britain’. Theresa May was 
scrabbling for a new vision. But it was one at odds with an electorate which wanted to 
reverse the effects of globalisation’ 
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The rhetoric of ‘Global Britain’, however, continues to present leaving the EU as a 
forward looking moment of stepping ‘out into the world’ leaving the ‘outdated’, ‘little’, 
‘Socialist’, Europe of the EU, as trade barriers dissolve in an apotheosis of (neo)liberal 
promise.  Yet in the aftermath of the referendum the ‘Global Britain’ mantra (Siles-Brügge, 
2018, p.2) morphed at times into something which sounded distinctly less forward looking 
with references to ‘Empire 2.0’ (Coates 2017).    For Isakjee and Lorne (2018, p.4) ‘However 
offensive this label, however unrealistic such expectations and divorced from rational policy, 
the politics of Brexit played here speaks to a spatial imaginary of Britain’s ‘lost greatness’’4.  
In this way ‘discursively, the hyperglobalist position evokes nostalgia for the nineteenth 
century economic order – the era of a sovereign Britain exercising a supposedly benign 
influence over a global regime of free trade’ (Rosamond, 2018, p. 7).  In 
performative/political terms this historically orientated imaginary of Britain’s place in the 
world, subtly cultivated a nostalgic sense of loss which connected elite post-imperial 
narratives of ‘Britain’s declining historical global power and ‘leadership’ with the real 
material degradations of those suffering from the ravages of the neoliberal economy’ (Isakjee 
and Lorne, 2018, p.4).  In this way it sought to obfuscate some of the contradictions in the 
simultaneously inward facing ‘territorial communitarian’ (Santamaria and Elissalde, 2018) 
and outward looking ‘hyperglobalist’ (Siles-Brügge, 2018) imaginaries of the ‘Brexit’ project. 
This helped to cement the ‘alliance between hyperglobalist neoliberals and nativist economic 
nationalists’ which contributed to the referendum result (Rosamond, 2018, p. 7 citing 
Finlayson 2016). 
 
                                                 
4
 The idea of building a new Royal Yacht has been floated as a way to help boost British trade prospects 
(Worley, 2018). It was not reported, however, if this was to come pre-equipped with pith helmets.  
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Global Britain and Empire 2.0 are also bound up in selective and hierarchical imaginaries 
that. Links with ‘old friends’ in the ‘Anglosphere’ are emphasised, and for Siles-Brügge 
(2018, p.13) such ‘Talk of ‘kith and kin’ has so far obscured deregulatory intentions and 
‘Global Britain’s’ potentially disruptive distributive impacts’. There is a notable tendency too 
to home in on a select number countries in North America and Australasia. Environment 
Secretary, Michael Gove, for example, has invoked the notion of ‘sister countries across the 
globe such as Canada and New Zealand’ (Channel 4 News, 2018), some of which it is stated 
want to ‘Help Brexit’ (note, not help Britain) (Figure 8).  Beyond such obvious questions as 
‘Aren’t Nigeria and Zambia sister countries too?’, the representational imaginaries, of Global 
Britain/Empire 2.0 also have to contend with the fact that Commonwealth and other former 
dominions have so far given a lukewarm response to the suggestion of any form of rebooted 
British tutelage (Verheijen, 2018), and countries like New Zealand and Australia are seeking 
trade deals with the EU (Boffey, 2018).  
 
FIGURE 8 NEAR HERE 
 
O wad some Pow'r the giftie gie us, To see oursels as ithers see us! (Burns, 1786) 
 
Global Britain/Empire 2.0 are revealing of how so often within ‘Brexit’ assumptions and 
imaginaries the external world is apparently a passive and supportive backdrop without its 
own materiality and/or existence autonomous to British interests and strategy. Thus for 
Ricketts (2017) ‘The Global Britain (or, dreadfully, Empire 2.0) rhetoric is based on an 
understanding of African and Commonwealth nations as junior partners who would jump at 
any opportunity to forge closer links with the UK’.  Similarly, references to the ‘post-Brexit 
world’ which surface in conversations, the plans of organisations for the future, and even in 
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some academic writing, may well be simply a turn of phrase, but if taken literally what might 
this imply?  We might envisage a ‘post-Brexit Britain’ and a ‘post-UK EU’, but does the UK 
leaving the EU contain enough creative-destructive potential to generate a ‘post-Brexit 
world’? And if there are ‘Brexit’ imaginaries of Britain’s place in the world, then what are the 
‘external’ world’s imaginaries of ‘Brexit’? There is no space here to consider this at length, 
but images from the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo (Figure 9) and the Belgium 
cartoonist Oli (Figure 10), provide views from two external observers which it is at leat 
interesting to set alongside the Eurosceptic imaginary of  Britain’s ‘insular exceptionalism’. 
 
FIGURE 9 NEAR HERE 
FIGURE 10 NEAR HERE  
 
Conclusion  
 
The UK’s EU referendum and its aftermath point to the importance of paying attention to the 
performativity of spatial imaginaries and the ‘far reaching claims’ they generate ‘on our social 
and political lives’ (Davoudi 2018, p.97).  This requires further engagement with issues only 
tangentially considered above including citizenship, identity, different notions of political 
legitimacy, and populism, which entertain close links with representational and performative 
spatial imaginaries. It seems clear, for example, that the imaginaries discussed above are laced 
with markers of what Jessop terms a ‘wider organic crisis in the social order, reflected in 
contestation over ‘British values’, disputed national and regional identities, north–south and 
other regional divides, the metropolitan orientation of intellectual strata, and generational 
splits’ (2018, pp.1736-7). And with similar scenes and political-spatial narratives being 
played out in other places - e.g. notions of ‘Main Street v. Wall Street’ in the US, or the 
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‘peripheral v. metropolitan France’ imaginaries of the French presidential campaign of 2017, 
there is potential for an international research agenda addressing questions such as ‘what 
work do spatial imaginaries do in agonistic political processes’, and ‘what subsequent 
demands do they make on policy development’?   
 
In the aftermath of the UK’s 2016 EU referendum, as Isakajee and Lorne (2018, p.1) note the 
‘proposition of the ‘left behind’ has become particularly prevalent, the disaffection of whom it 
is thought to have contributed’ to the referendum result. It is persuasive to consider that the 
associated spatial imaginary of ‘Left Behind Britain’ has subsequently attained significant 
perfomative agency, capturing a sense of dissatisfaction with an imperfect present, which has 
been conscripted by the leave lobby as the problem to which the classic ‘solution in search of 
a problem’ of ‘Brexit’ becomes the ‘revolutionary’ answer (The Economist, 2017).  The 
question of what, if any, future social settlement, equilibrium, or ‘new normal’ might look 
like however remains wide open and contested – the performative potential arises from the 
representational properties rather than material outworkings of the imaginary. The ‘left 
behind’ narrative and imaginary also contributes to evacuating other readings of the 
territoriality of the referendum vote, laying its causes firmly before the door of ‘Left Behind 
Britain’ - a convenient strategy of ‘forward defence’ perhaps for the Brexit elites if the 
journey to the sunlit uplands is less straightforward than promised. It also legitimates ‘Brexit’, 
short-circuiting resistance, and cleverly ‘stealing the clothes’ of progressives’ established 
concern with uneven development, though without so far offering anything of material 
substance in its place.  Yet whilst we would argue that the Eurosceptic lobby has had 
considerable success in generating and mobilising imaginaries and conscripting emergent 
imaginaries to its cause in the UK’s long running European debate and since 2016, it is clear 
that tensions remain within and between the spatial imaginaries through which ‘Brexit’ is 
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being represented and performed politically – not least as regards future growth model(s) for 
the UK and their spatial implications (Rosamond, 2018). With poorer regions predicted to be 
the biggest economic losers of any version of ‘Brexit’ (McCann, 2018) these are issues of 
material consequence.  Nor do such issues arise in an historical vacuum, for as Jessop 
observes, not only has the UK evolved a ‘divergent set of regional economies with marked 
differences in economic structure, sectoral composition and trade performance’, but ‘These 
problems are aggravated by the historical weakness of the British state and its inability to 
pursue a serious economic strategy consistently and effectively’ (2018, p.1735). The 
dominant ‘legitimating’ imaginary of the referendum and its aftermath ‘Left Behind Britain’, 
thus sits uneasily with the predictions of ‘Brexit’s negative material impacts on this 
geography if the UK leaves the EU - the imaginary of ‘Poor Britannia’.  It also resides in 
tension with the ‘Brexit’ project’s nationally and externally/globally orientated imaginaries of 
‘Global Britain/Empire 2.0’ which essentially seek to promulgate a nostalgia-tinged version 
of the neoliberal and ‘free trade’ focussed accumulation strategies partly credited with 
creating ‘the space for extreme populist blowback against neoliberalization’ in the first place 
(Jessop, 2018, p.1733).  Despite the proto-Brexit state’s initial apparent ‘hearing’ of the call 
of ‘Left Behind Britain’ in the early days following the referendum, it is the giddy hyper 
liberal and/or nostalgic imaginaries of Britain’s new/rediscovered place in the world that 
continue to excite the imagination of many of those who willed ‘Brexit’ on the nation5. Such 
confrontations and contradictions may yet provide the ‘Brexit project’ with some of its 
biggest challenges and call for continued attention from geographers, not just to how they 
surface in any emergent geopolitical and economic settlements at global, regional, national 
                                                 
5
 Former UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson even called for his department to have its own plane to 
help boost ‘post-Brexit’ trade prospects (Stewart, 2018). 
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and substate scales, but also to how in practice ‘Brexit surfaces across a variety of everyday 
scenes and situations’ (Anderson and Wilson, 2018). Across the scales and types of imaginary 
which have apparently served the Eurosceptic cause so well, the agency of physical and 
material geographies should also not be underestimated.  The irreducible properties of 
physical distance and time, the logics of territorial scale, the ‘real’ mechanics of international 
trade, and the predicted uneven internal regional impacts of leaving the EU within the UK, 
may lead even some proponents of ‘Brexit’ to discover that geography still matters in 
enduring and novel ways, which may yet interpolate some of the ‘geographical’ imaginings 
that underpin their project.  
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Outer space 
Global 
Supranational Region 
Nation-state  
Sub-state nation 
Subnational region 
City 
Home  
 
Table 1 – Scales of spatial imaginary (adapted from Watkins, 2015, p.511) 
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1. How is the spatial imaginary bounded and what are its scales?  
 
2. What are the key descriptive concepts, categories and measures?  
 
3. How is the spatial imaginary positioned in relation to other spatial  
entities? What are its connectivities and how are these produced?  
 
4. Who or what is ‘in focus’? Who is present? How are non-present  
issues and people brought ‘to the front’? Who/what is ‘in shadow’  
or in ‘back regions’?  
 
5. How is the connection between past, present and future established?  
 
6. Whose viewpoint and whose perceived and lived space is being 
privileged?  
 
 
Box 1 - A framework for interpreting and analysing spatial imaginaries 
Crawford, 2017, p. 20, 74 adapted from Healey, 2007, pp. 209-210 
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Figure 1 – ‘The EU is letting in more and more countries’ 
Source:  Vote Leave (2016)
1
   
 
Figure 2 – ‘What the EU ‘tourist deal’ means’ – Britain’s new border is with Syria and Iraq 
Source:  Vote Leave (2016)
1
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Figure 3 – ‘Breaking Point’, UKIP Poster 
Source: United Kingdom Independence Party (2016)
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Figure 4 – The ‘Bunch of Grapes’ – a vision of more balanced development in Europe  
Source: Kunzmann and Wegener (1991) 
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Figure 5 – Trans-European Network Map 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-
portal/site/maps_upload/metro_map2013.pdf 
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Figure 6 – An Imaginary of ‘Brexitland’ and ‘Remainia’  
Source: CNN 2016 https://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/24/europe/eu-referendum-britain-
divided/index.html 
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Figure 7 – Skegness from ‘bracing’ to ‘Brexit’ 
Sources: Left: Hassall, J. (1868 - died 1948) (artist) for London and North Eastern Railway 
(issuer); Right: https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/top-stories/this-is-why-skegness-is-the-
seaside-town-brexit-could-close-down-1-4977081 
 
Figure 8 – ‘New Zealand and Australia Want to Help Brexit’  
Source: https://globalbritain.co.uk/ (accessed 22.05.18) 
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Figure 9 – Les Anglais enfin maitres chez eux 
 Source : Artist Laurent ‘Riss’ Sourisseau. Retrieved from 
https://www.indy100.com/article/charlie-hebdo-gave-its-verdict-on-brexit-and-its-not-
flattering--ZJf0gMYZSb  
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Figure 10 – Brexit! Et voila! Enfin libres!  
Source : Artist, Oli, http://www.humeurs.be/2016/06/brexit-good-bye-
uk/sp20160624_brexit-1000/ 
 
 
